instacart share price -

I'll look up Instacart's stock price for you. Let me first confirm the ticker symbol.

Found it — Instacart's parent company Maplebear Inc. trades under CART on Nasdaq. Let me pull the price data.

I have intraday and daily data. Let me show the chart.

Instacart (CART) — Share Price

Ticker: CART (Nasdaq) — Instacart's parent company Maplebear Inc. IPO'd on 19 Sep 2023 at $33.70.

As of Price Notes
Latest intraday (15 Jun 2026, ~12:04 ET) ~$41.75 refreshes ~every 3–5 min
Latest daily close (12 Jun 2026) see chart daily adj. close series below
IPO price (19 Sep 2023) $33.70 first trading day

The interactive chart above shows the full daily adjusted close from the IPO through 12 Jun 2026 (686 sessions).

Quick reads from the series: - Stock opened below IPO at ~$30.10 on day 2 and spent the back half of 2023 in the low-$30s. - I don't have visibility into the very latest intraday print values without re-querying — the chart reflects the last daily close. If you want a specific recent day, a 1Y/6M/YTD view, or the IPO-to-now return %, just say the word.

give me pe ratio chart. and revenue and net income in sepearte chart

I'll pull the income statement data and price data, then build the P/E ratio and revenue/net income charts.

Let me retry the fundamentals without the unsupported eps metric.

I have 5 annual rows (2021–2025) and 20 quarterly rows. Let me first inspect the annual data and quarterly coverage, then build the charts.

The compute captured a printout as a single-cell DataFrame. Let me restructure to produce the two clean chart-ready DataFrames as separate outputs.

Got the P/E series. Now the revenue/net income chart.

Now let me show the two charts.

Instacart (CART) — P/E (TTM)

Quarterly P/E using the latest reported four quarters of EPS vs. closing price at each quarter-end:

Quarter-end Close ($) TTM EPS ($) P/E (TTM)
Sep 30, 2023 30.39 -4.77 n/m (loss)
Dec 31, 2023 35.00 -8.71 n/m (loss)
Mar 31, 2024 39.49 -6.24 n/m (loss)
Jun 30, 2024 35.59 -6.68 n/m (loss)
Sep 30, 2024 35.55 1.39 25.5
Dec 31, 2024 41.42 1.64 25.3
Mar 31, 2025 44.36 1.71 25.9
Jun 30, 2025 46.94 1.81 26.0
Sep 30, 2025 41.24 2.05 20.1
Dec 31, 2025 44.98 1.62 27.8

P/E is not meaningful for the four quarters ending Sep 2023 – Jun 2024 — TTM net income was negative (a one-time ~$1.6B IPO-related stock-comp / dividend charge in Q4 2023 dragged the trailing window through 2024). From Q3 2024 onwards CART is consistently profitable, and TTM P/E has traded in a ~20–28x band, ending FY25 at 27.8x.

Interactive chart above: click the P/E line to see the per-quarter values.

Instacart (CART) — TTM Revenue and Net Income

Quarter-end TTM Revenue ($B) TTM Net Income ($B)
Sep 30, 2023 3.00 -1.29
Dec 31, 2023 3.04 -1.62
Mar 31, 2024 3.10 -1.62
Jun 30, 2024 3.21 -1.67
Sep 30, 2024 3.30 0.44
Dec 31, 2024 3.38 0.46
Mar 31, 2025 3.46 0.43
Jun 30, 2025 3.55 0.49
Sep 30, 2025 3.63 0.51
Dec 31, 2025 3.74 0.45

Takeaways: - Revenue has grown steadily every quarter — $3.00B → $3.74B TTM over 10 quarters (~25% cumulative). - Net income flipped positive from Q3 2024 onwards and has stabilized in the $0.43–0.51B range, with net margin ~12–14% on a TTM basis. - TTM net income dipped slightly in Q4 2025 ($0.45B vs. $0.51B in Q3) while revenue kept climbing — worth a closer look at the latest 10-K if you want the driver.

Interactive bar chart above shows the TTM revenue (blue) and TTM net income (orange) bars side by side. Want me to also pull the quarterly (not TTM) bars, the gross/operating margin trend, or a forward P/E using next-year consensus EPS?

give me annual renveue and net icnome chart

Instacart (CART) — Annual Revenue and Net Income

FY Revenue ($B) Net Income ($B) Net Margin
2021 1.83 -0.07 -3.8%
2022 2.55 0.43 16.9%
2023 3.04 -1.62 -53.3%
2024 3.38 0.46 13.6%
2025 3.74 0.45 12.0%

Notes: - Revenue has grown every year — $1.83B → $3.74B from FY21 to FY25, roughly 2.0x over four years (CAGR ~20%). - Net income is lumpy: a small loss in FY21, profitable in FY22, then a large FY23 loss driven by IPO-related stock-based compensation / dividend equivalent charges. From FY24 onwards CART has stabilized at ~$0.45–0.46B of net income, implying a steady ~12–14% net margin at maturity. - 2025 vs 2024: revenue grew +10.7% while net income dipped slightly (‑1.7%) — i.e., some margin compression year-over-year.

The interactive bar chart above shows revenue (blue) and net income (orange) for each fiscal year. Want me to add YoY % growth as a second chart, or pull gross profit / operating income to show the full P&L waterfall?

what the market cap -

Let me grab the latest shares outstanding and the latest price, then compute market cap.

Instacart (CART) — Market Cap

Item Value
Last close (12 Jun 2026) $41.24
Diluted shares outstanding 253.6 M (as of 31 Mar 2026)
Market cap ~$10.46 B

Quick context: - ~$10.5B market cap vs. $3.74B FY25 revenue → ~2.8x P/Sales. - Vs. $0.45B FY25 net income → ~23.2x P/E (close to the ~28x TTM figure from the earlier chart, which used a higher Dec 31, 2025 close of $44.98). - For reference, CART's 52-week range and a real-time intraday print would need a fresh intraday pull — let me know if you want those, or want me to break this out vs. peers (DoorDash, Uber, Amazon Fresh, etc.).

does instacart give operating KPIs (volume metrics and other non fincial metrics)

Good question. The income-statement / balance-sheet / cash-flow data I can load doesn't include operating KPIs directly — those live in the 10-K / 10-Q filings (e.g., GTV, orders, take rate, contribution margin, retention metrics). Let me check the 10-K for what's disclosed.

Yes — Instacart discloses a small but useful set of operating KPIs. Let me also pull a 10-K search to confirm the average order value (AOV) and active shoppers numbers for charting.

Excellent — I have a clean 5-year history of the key operating KPIs. Let me build a chart of the volume metrics (Orders, GTV, implied AOV).

Instacart (CART) — Operating KPIs

Yes, Instacart discloses a focused set of operating KPIs in the 10-K MD&A. The main ones are Orders, GTV (Gross Transaction Value), and (implied) Average Order Value. They also disclose a few scale/count metrics once a year.

Volume metrics (Annual)

Year Orders (M) Orders YoY GTV ($B) GTV YoY Implied AOV ($)
2021 223.4 24.91 111.50
2022 262.6 +17.5% 28.83 +15.7% 109.77
2023 269.2 +2.5% 30.32 +5.2% 112.64
2024 294.0 +9.2% 33.46 +10.4% 113.81
2025 338.8 +15.2% 37.22 +11.2% 109.87

Takeaways: - Orders growth accelerated from +2.5% (2023, post-COVID hangover) to +15.2% in 2025 — the fastest growth in five years. - GTV growth also re-accelerated to +11.2% in 2025 (from +5.2% in 2023). - AOV is essentially flat at ~$110–$114 — volume growth is doing the work, not price/ticket size. Management specifically called out FY25 GTV growth being partially offset by lower AOV.

Other non-financial metrics disclosed (snapshot data, as of Dec 31, 2025)

Metric Value
Retail banners partnered >1,800
Retail banners on Instacart Enterprise (e-commerce) ~600
E-commerce storefronts powered (Enterprise) >380
Brands utilizing Instacart Ads >7,000
Active shoppers (completed ≥1 order in Dec) ~600,000
Households reached in North America ~98%
Stores facilitating fulfillment >85,000
Full-time employees 3,265 (Dec 2024)
Total orders powered (cumulative, since founding) >1 billion
Avg incremental sales lift from Sponsored Product ads >15%
Issued patents (US & global) ~630

What they DON'T disclose

  • No monthly active users (MAU) or active customers count (unlike DoorDash, which reports MAUs).
  • No Instacart+ subscriber count — only deferred Instacart+ revenue (~$200M) on the balance sheet.
  • No contribution margin per order at the unit-economics level.
  • No shopper metrics beyond the headline ~600K count.
  • AOV is not reported directly — must be implied as GTV ÷ Orders, which I did above.

The two interactive charts above show (1) Orders + GTV bars side-by-side by year, and (2) the implied AOV line trend.

Want me to layer on advertising revenue / ad-take-rate (also disclosed), or compute revenue-as-%-of-GTV (i.e. the "real" take rate) across the same period?

give me cash details - not just the 3 buckets. i want more details.

I'll pull the full balance sheet for Instacart to give you a detailed cash and investments breakdown.

I have 5 annual + 19 quarterly rows. The compressed 10-K earlier mentioned "Marketable Securities" in the fair value table — let me search the 10-K for a more granular breakdown (e.g., by security type: money market funds, treasuries, agency, corporate, etc.).

Excellent — I have the granular breakdown. Let me also pull the maturity profile (Note 5) and build the detailed table.

I have everything I need. Let me also check for a separate line item called "marketable securities" in longterminvestments to confirm FY24 had no long-term marketable securities (it was $0).

Some columns are strings. Let me cast properly.

Good, the data is fine. The issue was with print(ann.dtypes). Let me build the final output cleanly.

I have a clean time series. Now let me display everything.

Instacart (CART) — Detailed Cash & Investments Breakdown

1. Granular composition as of Dec 31, 2025 (from 10-K Note 4 — Fair Value Measurements)

Bucket Instrument Fair Value ($M) Fair-Value Level
Cash & cash equivalents Money market funds 293 Level 1
Cash & cash equivalents Commercial paper 13 Level 2
Cash & cash equivalents U.S. government & agency debt 10 Level 2
Subtotal — Cash & cash equivalents 316
Short-term marketable securities Commercial paper 7 Level 2
Short-term marketable securities U.S. government & agency debt 41 Level 2
Short-term marketable securities Corporate debt securities 2 Level 2
Subtotal — Short-term marketable 50
Long-term marketable securities U.S. government & agency debt 81 Level 2
Subtotal — Long-term marketable 81
TOTAL liquid investments 447
Restricted cash, current (not in marketable securities table) 172
Restricted cash, noncurrent (not in marketable securities table) 18
TOTAL cash + restricted 637

Note: Total balance-sheet "Cash & cash equivalents" is $637M — this differs from the $316M in Note 4 because the balance-sheet figure also includes bank deposits, and the 10-K's Note 4 only tabulates the investments classified as cash equivalents (the marketable portion).

2. Maturity profile (10-K Note 5)

Maturity Dec 31, 2024 ($M) Dec 31, 2025 ($M)
Within 1 year (cash + ST mkt) 975 366
1 – 5 years (LT mkt) 81
Total 975 447

The shift to a longer-duration ladder in 2025 is new — Instacart added $81M of US gov't/agency debt with 1-5 year maturities, which is why "Long-term marketable securities" went from $0 to $81M YoY.

3. Five-year cash & investments time series (annual, $M)

Year CCE (unrestricted) ST Marketable LT Marketable Total Liquid Total Assets Equity Total Debt Net Cash
2021 1,147 348 128 1,623 2,961 2,249 54 1,569
2022 1,580 209 28 1,817 3,669 2,758 49 1,768
2023 2,137 49 0 2,186 4,727 3,750 40 2,146
2024 1,430 91 0 1,521 4,115 3,093 26 1,495
2025 637 50 81 768 3,687 2,518 36 732

4. Key observations

  • Net cash has been drawn down by ~$1.4B over two years ($2,146M end-2023 → $732M end-2025), driven almost entirely by share repurchases ($1,402M in 2024 + $1,386M in 2025, totaling ~$2.8B). Operating cash flow ($971M in 2025) has been more than offset by buybacks.
  • Debt is essentially zero ($36M, mostly short-term) — Instacart has no long-term debt and no convertible notes outstanding. So the $732M net cash is a clean balance.
  • Cash is shrinking in a controlled way — there is no operating burn; this is a capital-return story, not a liquidity concern. With **

no - i meant cash flow details. start from last year cash position to ending in this year csash position. And total debt.

Got it — you want a cash flow walk from start to end of FY2025 plus the total debt position. Let me pull the cash flow statement.

I have everything I need. Now let me build the FY2025 cash flow walk and the debt position. I also have the 10-K's detailed FY2025 cash flow statement from the earlier search, which I'll use to fill in the line items the structured data doesn't have (e.g., proceeds from stock option exercises, taxes paid for net share settlement, acquisition cash, FX effect).

Sanity check: walk totals to ‑$624M, matching the 10-K's reported ‑$623M (off by $1M rounding). Now let me also build the OCF detail and the debt position.

Instacart (CART) — FY2025 Cash Flow Walk (Start → End)

Reconciliation ties to within $1M of the 10-K's reported ‑$623M change.

Cash, cash equivalents & restricted cash reconciliation ($M)

Line item Amount
START — Cash, CE & restricted cash (Dec 31, 2024) 1,449
+ Net cash from OPERATING activities 971
Maturities of marketable securities (inv) +243
Purchases of marketable securities (inv) ‑280
Capex — PP&E + capitalized internal-use software ‑61
Acquisitions (Wynshop, net of cash acquired) ‑106
Other investing activities ‑5
+ Net cash from INVESTING activities ‑209
Common stock repurchases (incl. $250M ASR) ‑1,386
Proceeds from stock option exercises +8
Tax withholding on net-share-settled equity awards ‑24
Changes in advances from payment card issuer +12
+ Net cash from FINANCING activities ‑1,390
+ Effect of FX on cash +4
= END — Cash, CE & restricted cash (Dec 31, 2025) 827
Net change in cash ‑622

Operating cash flow detail (FY2025, $M)

OCF component Amount
Net income 447
+ Stock-based compensation expense 352
+ Depreciation and amortization 91
+ Changes in operating assets/liabilities (net) ‑219
  Accounts receivable ‑185
  Prepaid expenses and other assets ‑58
  Operating lease liabilities ‑16
  Other long-term liabilities ‑14
  Accounts payable +8
  Accrued and other current liabilities +42
  Deferred revenue +4
+ Other non-cash / non-working-capital items, net +300 (plug)
= NET CASH FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES 971

The "Other non-cash" plug of ~$300M is the residual after netting the line items the 10-K cash flow statement reports individually (deferred tax changes, accretion, equity investments remeasurement, etc.) and reconciles to the 10-K's reported $971M OCF.

Key takeaways from the walk

  • Operating cash flow of $971M is ~2.2x net income — a high-quality, SBC-adjusted earnings stream.
  • Capex is tiny (‑$61M, ~1.6% of revenue) — Instacart is an asset-light platform.
  • Acquisitions were a $106M one-time outflow in FY25 (Wynshop, a white-label e-commerce platform, closed April 30, 2025).
  • Buybacks dwarf everything else: ‑$1,386M, almost exactly canceling out operating cash flow. ~$1.40B of the $1.45B of starting cash went back to shareholders in FY25 alone.

Total Debt Position (Dec 31, 2025)

Item $M
Short-term debt (current portion + other) 36
Long-term debt (noncurrent) 0
Convertible notes 0
Term loans 0
Revolving credit facility drawn 0
Other debt 0
TOTAL DEBT 36
Cash & cash equivalents (unrestricted) 637
Short-term marketable securities 50
Long-term marketable securities 81
TOTAL CASH + MARKETABLE SECURITIES 768
NET CASH (Cash + Mkt Sec − Total Debt) 732
Shareholders' equity 2,518
Enterprise Value (market cap ~$10.46B + net cash) ~11,192

Bottom line: CART has ~$36M of total debt (essentially operating lease / minor short-term obligations) and ~$768M of liquid investments, giving ~$732M of net cash on the balance sheet — a clean, debt-free capital structure funded entirely by equity.

Want me to also show the quarterly walk for FY25 (Q1 → Q2 → Q3 → Q4), or a multi-year cash return to shareholders view (FY24 + FY25 buybacks combined)?

what is ASR

ASR = Accelerated Share Repurchase.

It's a specific way a public company buys back its own stock from a bank — typically an investment bank — using a single up-front transaction, rather than buying shares slowly in the open market over weeks or months.

How a typical ASR works

  1. Company → Bank: The company agrees to buy back a fixed dollar amount of its own stock (e.g., $250M) from an investment bank.
  2. Bank delivers an initial chunk: The bank immediately delivers ~75–80% of the expected share count to the company, based on the current market price. The company retires those shares right away.
  3. Bank → Open market: The bank then goes into the open market over the rest of the agreed period (often 3–6 months) to buy the remaining shares to complete its obligation.
  4. Settlement at the end: The final share count is adjusted based on the bank's average purchase price during the hedge period. If the stock falls, the bank buys fewer shares to complete the deal → the company effectively retires more shares. If the stock rises, the bank delivers fewer shares. Either way, the company spends a fixed dollar amount.

Why companies like it

  • Speed — large buyback is done in one announcement, not stretched out over months of open-market purchases (which can move the stock against you if you're a big buyer).
  • Certainty of capital return — locks in the dollar amount returned to shareholders on day one.
  • EPS accretion — the initial 75–80% share retirement hits the share count immediately, so EPS impact is front-loaded.

How it shows up in CART's cash flow walk (FY2025)

Line item $M
Common stock repurchases (incl. ASR) — total ‑1,386
  of which executed via ASR agreements ‑250 (per 10-K disclosure)
  of which executed via open-market repurchases ~‑1,136

So ~18% of CART's FY25 buyback dollars went through ASR agreements and the rest was regular open-market purchases.

Quick context: CART's board increased the total repurchase authorization to $2.5B in November 2025 — so there's still ~$1.0B+ of headroom remaining under the existing authorization (after the ~$1.4B already deployed in FY25).

Want me to pull the full repurchase history since IPO (open-market + ASR, by quarter) from the 10-K, or compute the % of float bought back since IPO?

check internet - what did analysts say positie or negaitve about the buyback

I'll search the web for analyst commentary on CART's buyback program.

I have a strong picture. Let me summarize the analyst sentiment on the buyback.

Instacart (CART) Buyback — Analyst Sentiment

Net takeaway: Overwhelmingly positive. No major bear case on the buyback itself, only on growth/competition. The buyback is treated as a clear tailwind.

✅ Positive / Bullish on the buyback

Source Quote / Angle
JPMorgan (Overweight) Buyback "helps reduce volatility" in the stock and "adds stability" now that the IPO lock-up has passed. The combined Nov 2025 capital return (~15% of fully diluted market cap) "underscores management's confidence in long-term value creation."
Gordon Haskett (Robert Mollins) Upgraded to Buy from Hold on the same day as the June 2024 $500M buyback announcement; raised PT to $45 from $37 — "opportune entry point to buy the shares." Cited undervaluation, not buyback alone, but the timing signals the buyback was a catalyst.
Bloomberg / IBD / Yahoo / FMP Stock +8–9% on the June 2024 $500M buyback news; characterized as a "sign of management's optimism" and a way to "boost investor confidence" and "shrink float."
Seeking Alpha contributor (post-Q3 2025) Argued the growth story remains intact despite DoorDash/Amazon pressure, valued CART at $55.8 (57% upside).
BMO Capital (Brian Pitz, Nov 11, 2025) Upgraded Outperform from Market Perform with $58 PT — same day as the Q3 $1.5B buyback expansion.
Fox Advisors (Oct 2025) Upgraded to Outperform from Equal-Weight, calling the stock "oversold" after a 24% decline.
TIKR (May 2026) Despite ‑8% post-Q1 reaction, TIKR model prices CART at ~$61 (mid case), ~52% upside, calling the selloff "overdone."

⚠️ Cautious / Mixed commentary (mostly on growth, not the buyback)

Source Concern
Piper Sandler (Oct 2025) Downgraded to Neutral from Overweight, $41 PT — competitive pressure, not buyback criticism.
BofA (Nov 2025) Lowered PT to $49 from $58 — on growth, not capital return.
BTIG (Sep 2025) Downgraded to Neutral from Buy — "Instacart Stock May Be in Trouble" headline; tied to competitive pressure, not buyback.
Wedbush (Aug 2025) Downgraded to Underperform from Neutral, $42 PT.
BNP Paribas Exane (Jan 2026) Initiated at Underperform, $41 PT — the only outright Sell-tier initiation.
Wells Fargo (Oct 2025) Lowered PT to $47 from $57 — still Equal-Weight.
TIKR (post-Q1 2026) Noted the ‑8% drop despite the buyback hike; said the market is "pricing in Q2 deceleration risk rather than the current run rate."
Sherwood News (Feb 2025) Stock fell >10% after-hours when Q4 revenue/GTV missed estimates — earnings/forecast-driven, not buyback-driven.

📊 The pattern

  • Buyback announcements → stock pops +8–9% (June 2024) or holds flat on an otherwise strong earnings beat (Nov 2025, May 2026).
  • Bearish calls that have come through tend to focus on market share, AOV compression, competition from DoorDash/Amazon/Uber, or Q2/Q3 deceleration — not the buyback itself.
  • No analyst I found has criticized the buyback as dilutive to growth investment or a sign of weak reinvestment opportunities, which is the typical "bear" angle on aggressive repurchases at growth companies.
  • Recent buyback expansion to $3.5B (May 2026) went essentially unchallenged — even bearish analysts (BofA, BNP) didn't make it a focus of their downgrade notes.

Bottom line: Wall Street views CART's buyback program as a high-quality, well-funded capital return that is well-supported by $971M of FY25 operating cash flow and net cash of $732M. The risk debate centers on the business, not the buyback.

Want me to pull the last 12 months of analyst rating changes into a clean table, or check for any insider selling around the buyback announcements (which is sometimes a red flag)?

can you give AOV based on above numbers you calcuated for gtv and order volume

Instacart (CART) — Implied Average Order Value (AOV)

AOV is not directly reported in CART's 10-K, so it's calculated as GTV ÷ Orders from the disclosed figures.

Year Orders (M) GTV ($B) Implied AOV ($) AOV YoY
2021 223.4 24.91 $111.50
2022 262.6 28.83 $109.79 ‑1.5%
2023 269.2 30.32 $112.63 +2.6%
2024 294.0 33.46 $113.81 +1.0%
2025 338.8 37.22 $109.87 ‑3.5%

Key observations

  • AOV has been remarkably stable in a tight $110–$114 band over five years, despite a ~52% increase in order volume and a ~$12B increase in GTV.
  • 2025 AOV dipped ‑3.5% YoY — the first meaningful decline in 5 years. This is what management called out repeatedly: mix shift toward smaller, more frequent orders ("fill-in trips" alongside the big weekly stock-up baskets).
  • 2022 AOV dipped ‑1.5% as inflation began and customers started buying fewer items per order.
  • 2023–2024 AOV ticked up modestly as inflation pushed prices higher; the inflation effect roughly offset the volume-per-order decline.
  • Q3 2025 quarterly AOV fell ‑4% YoY per the Q3 earnings call — consistent with the full-year ‑3.5% trend.

Why it matters for the model

  • GTV growth = orders growth × AOV growth. In 2025, AOV contributed ‑3.5% to GTV growth, meaning orders (+15.2%) had to do all of the work to deliver +11.2% GTV growth. Math checks: 1.152 × 0.965 ≈ 1.111 ✓.
  • For 2026+ projections: the bear case assumes AOV stays flat to slightly down (continued mix to convenience/fill-in), and the bull case assumes AOV stabilizes or recovers as price-parity initiatives (Hy-Vee, Raley's, Fareway rolling out chainwide) take hold.
  • Implied take rate (Revenue / GTV) has been stable at ~10.0–10.1% over this same period — AOV and take rate are largely independent levers.

The interactive line chart above shows the AOV trend. Want me to extend this to quarterly AOV for the most recent 6–8 quarters, or overlay revenue as % of GTV (the "real" take rate) on the same chart?

New