I'll look up NYT (New York Times) and load their free cash flow data.Now I'll compute free cash flow (operating cash flow minus capex) for both annual and quarterly data.Now let me also chart the trend:

Loading chart...## NYT Free Cash Flow (Annual, $M)

NYT's free cash flow has grown substantially, nearly 4x from $145M in 2019 to $551M in 2025. The strong 2025 jump was driven by operating cash flow surging to $584M (up from $411M in 2024), while capex remained disciplined around $34M. The only down year was 2022 ($114M), after which FCF rebounded sharply.

Loading chart...## NYT — Trailing Twelve-Month Free Cash Flow ($M)

Latest (Mar 26 TTM): FCF of $542M, dipping slightly from the Dec 25 peak of $551M but still the second-highest TTM print on record. The trend is clearly upward — FCF has roughly tripled from the Sep 22 trough of $106M to over $540M today, driven almost entirely by operating cash flow expansion while capex has stayed flat-to-lower.

The output is messy. Let me redo this cleanly.

Loading chart...## NYT — P/E and P/FCF Ratios (Year-End)

Latest (TTM through Mar '26, at $72.37):

The P/E has hovered in the 29–36x range (excluding the 2020 earnings dip), while P/FCF has compressed steadily from 35x in 2019 to ~21x today as free cash flow has far outpaced net income growth. FCF/Share ($3.31) is running well above EPS ($2.34), highlighting that NYT converts significantly more cash than accounting earnings suggest.

The key drivers of the gap are depreciation and stock-based compensation — both are non-cash charges that reduce net income but don't affect cash flow. Let me pull those.## NYT — Net Income to Free Cash Flow Bridge ($M)

The widening gap between FCF and net income comes down to two non-cash charges that depress GAAP earnings but don't consume cash:

1. Depreciation & Amortization — running at ~$92–95M annually. This is largely acquisition-related amortization (The Athletic, acquired in 2022, is the big one). It flows through the P&L as an expense but is added back in the cash flow statement.

2. Stock-Based Compensation — has grown sharply from $13M (2019) to $74M (2025). SBC is a real economic cost (it dilutes shareholders), but it's a non-cash charge, so it gets added back to operating cash flow.

Together, D&A + SBC added back $169M in 2025 — nearly half of net income. That's why FCF ($551M) ran so far ahead of NI ($344M). The flip side is that SBC growth means shares outstanding haven't contracted the way the FCF/Share metric might imply — dilution offsets some of that per-share benefit.

Now let me also compute the TTM version (through Mar '26):## NYT — P/E vs P/FCF vs P/(FCF–SBC)

Year-end multiples:

Latest TTM (Mar '26, at $72.37):

Treating SBC as a real expense (which it is — it dilutes shareholders) closes a meaningful portion of the gap. FCF–SBC per share of $2.85 sits right between reported EPS ($2.34) and headline FCF/Share ($3.31). The resulting 25.4x multiple is about 3.5 turns above the headline P/FCF of 21.9x, but still well below the P/E of 31.0x — the residual gap comes from D&A running well above capex (depreciation is ~$95M vs capex of ~$34M), which is a genuine cash benefit as long as maintenance capex stays low.

NYT Dividend Yield

Current: At $72.37, the latest quarterly dividend is $0.23 (TTM $0.82), for a yield of 1.13%.

The dividend has grown steadily — from $0.19 in 2019 to $0.82 TTM — but the yield has stayed modest (roughly 0.5–1.1%) as the stock price has appreciated faster. The payout ratio against FCF–SBC ($0.82 / $2.85) is just 29%, so there's ample room to keep raising it.

I'll look up the New York Times ticker and fetch both revenue and free cash flow data.Now let me load revenue data for the chart and also pull free cash flow data. Free cash flow isn't a direct stored metric, so I'll compute it from operating cash flow minus capital expenditures.Now let me compute free cash flow and then show both the chart and table.

Loading chart...New York Times — Annual Revenue & Free Cash Flow

Revenue has grown steadily from $1.81B in 2019 to $2.82B in 2025, a 56% cumulative increase. Free cash flow expanded significantly, particularly in the last two years — hitting $551M in 2025, nearly 4x the 2019 level. The 2025 surge in operating cash flow ($584M) drove FCF to a record, reflecting strong operating leverage as the digital subscription model scales. The revenue chart is displayed alongside.

Let me dig into NYT's SEC filings to find the segment-level revenue breakdown (digital vs. print and other).Good, I have 2024 data. Now let me get the earlier years (2023, 2022, 2021, 2020, 2019) to build the full trend, and also grab the quarterly data to compute TTM.Now let me also get the 2019 data for a complete picture, and also grab the 2025 annual data to see the latest.Now let me also get the quarterly data from the P&L we already loaded (dataframe 1270) and cross-reference it with the SEC filing data to compute TTM segment revenues. Let me also get the 2025 annual filing.I now have enough data to build the trend. Let me organize what I've gathered from SEC filings and compile the TTM segment revenue chart. I'll build this from the annual data I extracted. Here's a summary of what I have:

From filings, the segment breakdown is clear. Let me now build the computed DataFrame for the chart. I'll use the annual revenue breakdowns from each 10-K and compute a TTM-style view.

The segments NYT reports are: - Subscription: Digital-only subs + Print subs - Advertising: Digital ads + Print ads
- Other: Wirecutter, licensing, building rental, etc.

Now I'll compile this into a DataFrame for the trend chart.

Loading chart...New York Times — Revenue by Segment ($M)

Key takeaways:

• Digital Subscription is the growth engine — more than doubled from $598M to $1,255M (110% growth) and now accounts for ~49% of total revenue
• Print Subscription is in managed decline, from $597M peak in 2020 to $534M, but erosion is slow (~2% annually)
• Digital Advertising grew from $229M to $344M, overtaking Print Advertising decisively in 2021 — now 2.1x larger than print ads
• Print Advertising collapsed from $302M in 2019 to $162M — down 46%, reflecting the secular shift
• Other (Wirecutter, licensing, building rental) grew steadily from $198M to $291M, driven by Wirecutter affiliate revenue and licensing deals

The digital transformation story is stark: digital revenue streams (subs + ads) have grown from $827M (46% of total) in 2019 to $1,599M (62% of total) in 2024.

Let me search the SEC filings for the key operating metrics NYT reports outside the financial statements — things like subscribers, ARPU, unique visitors, etc.Now I have a comprehensive dataset. Let me compile the key operating metrics into trend charts. I'll create two panels: one for subscribers and one for ARPU/audience metrics.

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Loading chart...Here are the key operating metrics NYT reports outside of financial statements, with trendlines across four charts:

Chart 1: Total Subscriber Growth

The total subscriber base nearly tripled from 4.4M to 11.4M, driven entirely by digital growth. Print continues a slow, orderly decline (~23K/year). The company targets 15M total subscribers by YE 2027.

Chart 2: Digital Subscriber Mix Evolution

The bundle strategy is working: Bundle subscribers surged from 1.6M to 5.4M (now 50% of digital). News-only subscribers are being deliberately cannibalized — dropping from 3.9M to 1.9M as they upgrade to the bundle.

Chart 3: Digital ARPU by Tier (per 28-day billing cycle)

Bundle ARPU is declining (from $15.85 to $12.18) as new subscribers enter at promotional rates — but this is an intentional volume play. News-only ARPU rose sharply (+38%) as remaining standalone subscribers face price increases. Total blended ARPU is stable at ~$9.40.

Chart 4: Monthly Average Unique Visitors

Audience spiked in 2020 (Covid/Trump news cycle), then normalized. The ~137M global monthly visitors represent the top of the funnel — a massive non-paying audience that can be converted to subscribers over time.

Good questions. Let me dig into the filings for management's own commentary on these two trends.Now let me also look at the earlier years for advertising dynamics and reader traffic trends.Excellent. Now I have all the data needed for a thorough answer. Here's the analysis:

Why Digital Advertising Looks Flat

It's not a demand problem — it's two offsetting forces within digital advertising that create the appearance of stagnation:

The mix shift within digital advertising:

Digital advertising at NYT has two components:

NYT has been deliberately letting go of low-value programmatic/open-market advertising in favor of higher-quality direct-sold campaigns. The filings tell the story year by year:

• 2021: Core digital grew $77.4M; programmatic shrank 8.4%
• 2022: Core digital grew $29M (including Athletic); programmatic shrank 19.8%
• 2023: Programmatic impressions surged 54% but rates collapsed 28% — revenue stayed flat
• 2024: Direct-sold impressions +10% (rate -5%); programmatic impressions +40% but rate -18%

So core digital is growing steadily, but the programmatic/open-market piece has been a drag — the company is essentially firing low-quality ad revenue and replacing it with better inventory, but the transition masks the underlying growth.

The bigger structural point: NYT is deliberately not optimizing for ad revenue. Advertising has fallen from 29% of total revenue in 2019 to ~20% in 2024. The subscription-first strategy means ads are secondary. Management would rather lose a few ad dollars than compromise the subscriber experience with intrusive advertising. This is a feature of the model, not a bug.

On MAU Trends — Not Really Declining

The unique visitor chart is noisy but not a structural decline story:

2020 was an anomaly — the Covid pandemic + Trump election year drove unprecedented news consumption. That's not a sustainable baseline. The real normalized range is ~125–145M globally.

From 2021 to 2024, global MAUs went from 125M → 137M — that's actually up ~10%.

The risks NYT itself flags:

The 10-K explicitly cites "platform dependence" and "digital traffic referrals from third parties" — meaning Google search algorithm changes, social media deprioritizing news, and AI-generated summaries all threaten referral traffic. NYT has noted this as a "risk factor" in every recent filing.

But here's the thing: as the subscriber base grows (4.4M → 11.4M), NYT becomes less dependent on random search/social traffic. Direct visits and app opens from paying subscribers are far more valuable than fly-by Google referrals. The MAU metric matters less when 11.4M people pay you directly.

Bottom line: MAUs are roughly flat in a post-Covid normalization, not declining. And the business model increasingly insulates NYT from audience fluctuations — 69% of revenue is now subscription, not ad-dependent. The metric to watch is subscriber growth, not unique visitors.

Let me search for more recent data — the latest quarterly filings for 2025 and 2026.I now have extensive quarterly data through Q1 2026. Note that the Q1 2026 10-Q simplified reporting — no longer breaking out Bundle/News-only/Other subcategories or Unique Visitors. Let me now build updated charts with the latest data.Now let me display the updated charts:

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Loading chart...Here are the updated operating metrics with data through Q1 2026:

Chart 1: Total Subscribers

Total subscribers have nearly tripled from 4.4M to 13.1M in just over 6 years. The Q1 2026 print number (560K) is now just 4.3% of the total base. At the current pace, NYT is on track to hit the 15M target by YE 2027.

Chart 2: Digital Subscriber Mix

The bundle now represents 53% of all digital subscribers (6.27M of 11.76M). News-only has shrunk from 3.9M to just 1.6M — down 60% in three years. Other single-product (The Athletic, Games, Cooking, Wirecutter) is the wildcard, surging to 3.9M. Note: starting Q1 2026, NYT stopped reporting this breakdown, likely as the bundle strategy makes the categories less meaningful.

Chart 3: Digital ARPU

Total ARPU has been grinding higher — $8.93 → $9.77 — as subscribers graduate from promotional pricing. Bundle ARPU has stabilized around $12.50-$12.84 after the big promotional-dilution drop in 2022-23. News-only ARPU has surged from $8.24 to $12.67 (+54%) — the remaining standalone news subscribers are being priced up aggressively.

Chart 4: Digital vs Print Advertising (quarterly, $M)

Digital advertising is now decisively re-accelerating:

Q1 2026 digital advertising surged 31.6% YoY to $93M — driven by display (+$12.4M), podcast (+$4.6M), creative services (+$2.7M) and video (+$2.3M). Display impressions +15%, average rate +5%. That's real pricing power. Digital now represents 73.5% of all ad revenue. Print ads continue their secular erosion at ~10%/year.

Key update to my earlier analysis: Digital advertising is no longer flat — it has broken out. The 2024-2026 period shows clear acceleration, with quarterly digital ad revenue growing from ~$63M to ~$98M. The earlier "flat" narrative was the period of deliberate programmatic culling; now that the mix shift is complete, core growth is shining through.