That's a great question about Buffett's investment philosophy. Let me pull up Berkshire Hathaway's current and historical holdings to give you a concrete, data-backed answer.The data tools here focus on financial statements and price histories rather than 13F filings, so let me address your question directly based on what's well-documented about Buffett's actual behavior:

Yes — Buffett has famously held stocks through extreme valuations, and this is one of the most misunderstood aspects of his approach.

The canonical example is Coca-Cola (KO). Berkshire bought its stake in 1988-89 at a cost basis of ~$1.3 billion. By 1998, KO traded at a P/E north of 45-50x — extraordinarily high for a beverage company. Buffett was widely criticized for not selling. The stock then went essentially nowhere for the next ~12 years. He later acknowledged this as a mistake, famously saying he should have sold.

But here's the tension: he didn't sell. He held KO for decades and it remains a top holding.

The philosophy, in his own words:

• "Our favorite holding period is forever." When he finds a truly great business, he'd rather hold through overvaluation than try to time the exit and re-entry, which introduces two taxable events and the risk of being wrong.

• "It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price." Once he owns that wonderful company, selling creates a new problem: what to do with the cash.

• That said, he does trim when valuations get extreme. He sold a portion of Apple (AAPL) in 2024 after it had run up enormously — and Apple was never at 100x P/E. He's more valuation-sensitive than the "never sell" caricature suggests.

The P/E 100 question specifically: Buffett has rarely if ever bought anything near 100x earnings. But has he held into triple-digit territory on its way up? Possibly with something like See's Candies (a private subsidiary) or during the dot-com era with positions like Gillette. But in the public portfolio, the pattern is clearer: he buys at reasonable multiples, holds through overvaluation if the business quality justifies it, and occasionally — reluctantly — trims.

The real insight: quality of the business, not the P/E, is his North Star. A high P/E on a durable moat doesn't bother him nearly as much as a low P/E on a deteriorating business.